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Abstract 
It’s a well known empirical fact that actual option prices show persistent and systematic deviations 
from Black-Scholes option values. While a substantial number of enhancements have been proposed 
in the literature, these approaches typically leave investor’s preferences towards risk unmodified. Re-
cently, empirical studies using option prices find support for non-concave utility functions proposed 
by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper, we study option prices in an economy where investors are 
loss averse over fluctuations in the value of their financial wealth. The design of our pricing model is 
influenced by prospect theory, including behavioral aspects like risk attitude, mental accounting and 
probability perception. The theoretical marginal prospect option writer is risk averse in the domain of 
gains, risk taking in the domain of losses; (s)he overestimates small probabilities and underestimates 
large probabilities of the option being exercised in-the-money. The pricing framework can help to ex-
plain the implied volatility pattern typically observed from actual option prices. Empirical analysis on 
European call options on the S&P 500 index shows that prospect option pricing models significantly 
improve the fitting performance in in-sample, as well as in out-of-sample analysis. Further, the analy-
sis shows that the marginal investor’s behavior is different from the prospect theoretical observations. 
In stead of being risk averse in the domain of gains, risk taking in the domain of losses, and overesti-
mate small and underestimate large probabilities of the option expiring in-the-money, marginal writers 
of call options on the S&P 500 index display the reverse behavior. 
 
JEL Codes: D01, G11, G12. 
Keywords: Prospect Theory, Framing, Mental Accounting, Risk attitude, Loss aversion, Probability 
perception, Weighting function, Option Pricing. 
 
 
 
* 
Correspondence to: Tel: +31-43-3883838; Fax: +31-43-3884875. E-mail: t.lehnert@finance.unimaas.nl. 
 2 
1. Introduction 
Pricing behavior in financial markets has traditionally been explained by assuming rational in-
vestors. They correctly update their beliefs when they receive new information and given their 
beliefs they make choices, which maximize their expected utility. In the past couple of decades, 
however, the finance literature has amassed a substantial number of observations of apparent 
anomalies with respect to expected utility theory. The possibility that some market participants 
behave less than rational has been considered and as a consequence prices might deviate from 
those predicted by the expected utility framework
1
. During the 1990s, finance literature started to 
re-explore psychological concepts to explain the behavior of market participants as a separate 
field of research. Most of the behavioral finance research has been focused on stock markets and 
attempts to explain among others phenomena like under- and overpricing, hypes and panic, pre-
mium between risky and risk-free assets, preference for cash dividends and the tendency to sell 
winning stocks rather than losing stocks. Overviews of the various aspects of behavioral finance 
have been given by Barberis and Thaler (2003), Goldberg and von Nitzsch (2001), Shefrin 
(2002), Shiller (1999) and Thaler (2005). Within the traditional finance paradigm, the most fre-
quently used model to determine the value of options is based on the theory of Black and Scholes 
(1973). This theory is based on a riskless portfolio of stocks and a call option on that stock. It is 
observed that prices of traded options systematically do deviate from the value calculated by the 
Black-Scholes theory (for an overview, see Mayhew, 1995). One explanation for this deviation is 
to question the assumptions of the theory. Another explanation is based on the fact that the 
Black-Scholes portfolio is not riskless (Omberg, 1991) and therefore behavioral aspects of (po-
tential) option investors do interfere with the pricing process of an option. 
At the empirical level, several studies have shown that option valuation models with con-
ditional heteroskedasticity and negative correlation between volatility and spot returns capture 
the particular mispricing pattern and significantly improve upon the performance of the Black-
Scholes model. The discrete-time GARCH option pricing model has shown to be a flexible, em-
pirically successful model (see among others Heynen, et al (1994), Duan (1996) and Heston and 
Nandi (2000)). Recently, an increasing number of simulation and numerical methods for this 
class of option pricing models become available (see Duan and Simonato (1998), Ritchken and 
                                                 
1
 Interestingly, the basic idea was already launched as early as 1759 in Adam Smith’s book about “The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments” (Nava, Camerer and Loewenstein, 2005). 
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Trevor (1999), Heston and Nandi (2000) and Duan et al. (2001)). Using a generalized GARCH 
option-pricing framework, Lehnert (2003) showed that conditional leptokurtosis and skewness 
reinforces the effects of conditional heteroskedasticity and asymmetry in the volatility process. 
His GARCH option pricing model driven by skewed generalized error distributed innovations 
outperforms the closed-form GARCH option pricing model of Heston and Nandi in-sample as 
well as out-of-sample. The improvements in pricing errors are particularly pronounced for out-
of-the money put and call options, while the model partly underperforms the Gaussian model for 
near-the-money options. The results are in line with recent results obtained by Christoffersen et 
al. (2006). While they demonstrate the importance of conditional skewness and jumps for the 
pricing of out-of-the-money puts, their closed-form Inverse Gaussian GARCH option pricing 
model significantly underperforms a standard Gaussian model for several other types of options. 
Therefore, the empirical evidence does not necessarily suggest that e.g. modeling jumps in re-
turns and volatility is the appropriate approach for the purpose of option valuation. In recent 
years, it becomes apparent that the mispricing for some types of options is only marginally im-
proved, but those models cannot adequately account for the particular pattern observed in option 
prices.  
On a less sophisticated level, partitioning of volatility with respect to moneyness and ma-
turity also diminishes the mispricing of options with the Black-Scholes model significantly (Du-
mas et al. (1998)). They propose so-called implied volatility functions to capture the observed 
implied volatility surface of traded options, but do not give any behavioral explanation. As vola-
tility is related to the underlying asset and not to a specific option series, it should be concluded 
that either the assumption in the Black-Scholes theory that the underlying is a geometric 
Brownian process is not correct or that investors hold different preferences for different option 
series. If we consider the first explanation with respect to stocks and indices, then it might be 
true that volatility is dependent on maturity because future return distributions of short horizon 
are generally leptokurtic, while higher horizon returns are normally distributed (Fama, 1965). It 
is therefore hard to imagine that volatility will have an effect on the actual prices within an op-
tion series of equal maturity with a longer horizon than one month. Therefore in this paper, we 
will focus on the second explanation, the one that assumes that deviations between actual option 
price and Black-Scholes model predicted value are due to behavioral aspects. 
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The first ‘behavioral’ explanation of option pricing is due to Shefrin and Statman (1993).  
They assumed prices of covered calls in a one period binomial setting and compared value func-
tion
2
 modified option prices with prices from the CRR model (Cox, Ross and Rubinstein, 1979). 
Particularly Shefrin and Statman focused on the writing of covered calls: writing call options on 
stock in possession and concluded that its perceived value and consequently the choice from it, is 
highly dependent on the parameters of the value function. The prospect theory expected value of 
the covered call position exceeds the prospect theory expected value of the stock-only position 
for investors who are sufficiently risk-averse in the domain of gains
3
.  
Shefrin and Statman do not consider the weighting function of the prospect theory. How-
ever, according to Shiller (1999) it is particularly the weighting function that may explain mis-
pricing of options. Breuer and Perst (2004) included a (competence modified) weighting function 
to determine the prospect value of discount reverse convertibles (DCRs). DCRs can be inter-
preted as a combination of a risk free asset with a short position in put options. Prospect values 
based on the Tversky-Kahneman values for its parameters, are compared with the Black-Scholes 
model in a multi period continuous time setting. Breuer and Perst conclude that investments in 
risk free assets are preferred in low drift stock markets; in higher drift stock markets the invest-
ment in stock is preferred, while in medium drift stock markets DCRs are preferred with low 
volatility and risk free assets with higher volatility prediction for the price of the stock.  
 Using the same set of parameter values for all agents suggests that they have the same 
attitude towards gains and losses. In their experimental study based on a one period binomial 
CRR estimation problem, Abbink and Rockenbach (2005) find a remarkable difference in the 
option pricing behavior of professional traders and students. Investors are assumed to follow an 
option valuation strategy with a separating price and will buy the option whenever the option 
price is lower than the separating price and will sell the option if the option price is higher than 
the separating price. At small probabilities professional traders have a significantly higher sepa-
rating prices compared to students. At large probabilities both traders and students have equiva-
lent separating prices, which are higher than the separation price at low probability. Their results 
suggest that it remains questionable whether it is realistic to generalize Tversky-Kahneman re-
sults with respect to the values of the parameters to real world trading processes. 
                                                 
2
 The authors consider the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) type of value function. 
3
 De Groot and Dijkstra (1996) re-analyzed value function modified covered calls in a dynamic setting using 
monthly returns on a Dutch equity index and came largely to the same conclusion as Shefrin and Statman. 
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Also in ‘markets’ that are not liquid, like investment projects, specific behavioral biases 
affecting the subjective valuation of (real) options have been reported. Howell and Jägle (1997) 
show that managers’ assessments of real options tend on average erratically deviate from the 
normative Black-Scholes model. Miller and Shapira (2004) find that buyers and sellers price op-
tions below their expected values with buyers’ prices consistently below sellers’ prices.  
Another way of looking at the behavioral aspect of option pricing is based on agent the-
ory in which economic agents behave according specified beliefs and therefore have different 
views about the value of a proposed proposition. Guo (1998) considered two agents with differ-
ent expectations with respect to the values of the parameters of the underlying geometric 
Brownian price process and was able to perfectly fit prices of call options on the S&P 500 index. 
The parameter values of the two agents from his analysis, however, are so far apart, that it is 
questionable whether these agents are representative for real world traders. Another two agent 
model due to Benninga and Mayshar (2000) shows that different expectations with respect to 
relative risk aversion might be another explanation for the observed mispricing of options. 
In a recent paper, Poteshman and Serbin (2003) analyze the early exercise of Chicago 
Board Options Exchange listed call options by different classes of investors over the 1996-1999 
period. They find support that there are a large number of early exercises that can be identified as 
clearly irrational without invoking any model of market equilibrium, and these exercises are not 
uniformly distributed across the investor classes. Irrational exercise is triggered both by the un-
derlying stock price attaining its highest level over the past year and by the underlying stock hav-
ing high past returns. Their findings provide evidence that prospect theory is operative in the op-
tions market and that it applies differentially across various classes of investors. In a related 
study, Blackburn and Ukhov (2006) investigate the shape of investor’s utility function. Using 
options on the stocks in the Dow Jones Index, they find support for non-concave utility functions 
with reference points as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky. The evidence for Kahneman and 
Tversky Prospect Theory value function is much stronger than the support for the standard con-
cave utility function. 
In this paper, we study option values in an economy where investors are loss averse over 
fluctuations in the value of their financial wealth. The design of our pricing model is influenced 
by prospect theory, including behavioral aspects like risk attitude, mental accounting and prob-
ability perception. Using prospect theory allows us to simplify a problem into mental accounts. 
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Rockenbach (2004) compares three different mental accounts with the CRR model in a one pe-
riod dichotomy setting and concludes that in a controlled classroom experiment mental accounts 
are a more realistic explanation of price estimation behavior than the CRR model, indicating the 
importance of mental accounting in the pricing of options. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2  introduces three important concepts relevant 
to the behavioral aspects of option pricing: ‘framing’, ‘mental accounting’ and ‘prospect theory’. 
In the next section, the concepts are applied to option pricing to establish a model to estimate 
marginal prospect-based prices. A numerical example is provided to highlight the effect of dif-
ferent degrees of prospect behavior on option prices. Section 4 deals with an empirical analysis 
of European call options on the S&P 500 index, including prospect-based option pricing and 
pricing based on elements of the prospect theory. Finally we will wrap up with a conclusion sec-
tion. 
 
2. Behavioral aspects of option pricing 
2.1. Framing 
Framing refers to the way a problem or proposition is presented. It is therefore objective to the 
subjects that take decisions based on the presented problem or proposition. In other words all 
subjects face the same setting within which the problem or proposition is being described. The 
presenter of the problem has the choice how to frame the problem; another presenter might frame 
the problem differently. An example of framing, based on Tversky and Kahneman (1986) is the 
well known Müller-Lyer illusion shown in Figure 1.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
If frame 1 is presented with the question which of the horizontal lines is longer, then generally A 
is selected while B is actually longer. If the problem is presented as shown in frame 2, the over-
whelming majority selects B as being the longer line. This simple example shows that the way 
the problem is framed is of utmost importance to final valuation and choice.  
With respect to option pricing or subjective option valuation one can frame propositions 
as one period dichotomy prospect, multi period dichotomy prospect, prospects with continuous 
outcomes or based on the actual options market data. One period dichotomy prospects are gener-
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ally used in controlled laboratory experiments. They, however, have the drawback of being over-
simplified and might be interpreted as a lottery rather than as the outcome of the actual dynamic 
processes of the stock market. Option traders interpret probabilities differently when exposed to 
a risky project, where objective probabilities are known or to uncertain prospects, where a sub-
jective assessment of probabilities is required (Fox, Rogers and Tversky, 1996). 
 
2.2. Mental accounting 
Mental accounting attempts to describe the process whereby people code, categorize and evalu-
ate economic outcomes. Mental accounting theorists argue that people group their assets into a 
number of non-fungible mental accounts or mental compartments (Thaler, 1980, 1985, 1999; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The decision process consists of two stages: editing and evalua-
tion. In the first stage, people breakdown complex problems into simpler sub problems (Kahne-
man and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In doing so, they apply rules of thumb, 
or heuristics, that facilitate the interpretation of the various possibilities from which they have to 
choose. After the various prospects have been edited and categorized, they are evaluated in the 
second stage of the decision process. The prospect with the highest value is chosen. The rules of 
thumb when editing and evaluation are necessarily a simplification. 
Mental accounting is a subjective process. In other words, it is the interpretation of eco-
nomic propositions by individuals or groups. The human mind simplifies the real world problem. 
Therefore mental accounts are generalizations and they tend to be as simple as feasible. Confus-
ingly the editing stage of the mental accounting process is also called the framing stage. In this 
paper we will refer to ‘framing’ as the way the problem is presented and to ‘mental accounting’ 
as the way the problem is subjectively interpreted. 
There may be a range of potential mental accounts for any particularly framed problem. 
First of all it is dependent on the way the problem is framed. Obviously, if the decision taker is 
presented a complex problem he will probably use a different way of mental accounting than if 
he is presented with a simple problem. For instance, if an option valuation proposition is pre-
sented in a dynamic continuous world the creation of a mental account is much more difficult 
than if the problem is presented as a dichotomy one period proposition. If we consider for exam-
ple the Müller-Lyer illusion presented in section 2.1 then the answer is clearly dependent on the 
frame in which it is presented. 
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The decision taker determines the relevant subject-matter of the problem in order to sim-
plify the problem based on his prior knowledge and experiences. If we again consider the 
Müller-Lyer illusion and we assume that frame 1 is being presented, then - with no prior knowl-
edge of the Müller-Lyer illusion - the mental account is equivalent to the presentation presented 
in frame 1. On the other hand, if the decision taker has previous knowledge about the Müller-
Lyer illusion – by for example being a psychology student – his/her mind will create a mental 
account similar to the presentation in frame 2. This example shows the creation of a mental ac-
count might be depending on previous experiences.  
Previous experience is also important in valuing option related problems. A scholar that 
is well familiar with the Black-Scholes theory values an option by applying the Black-Scholes 
model, while individuals with no prior Black-Scholes theoretical knowledge value an option by 
other (heuristic) means, for instance by considering the future density function of the price of the 
underlying asset or by considering potential cash flows. Substantial differences in estimation 
behavior of option values have been noticed between traders and students (Fox, Rogers and 
Tversky, 1996; Abbink and Rockenbach, 2005). This experience-based estimation seems to be in 
line with competence modification of the weighting function from prospect theory (Kilka and 
Weber,  2001). 
A breakdown of mental accounts into different type of assets or potential propositions of 
different risk class has been noted. There is a tendency to view economic propositions as  indi-
vidual investments rather than considering the whole portfolio in the decision process (Fisher 
and Statman, 1997; Shefrin and Statman, 2000). This phenomenon has been called ‘narrow fram-
ing’ by Thaler and he further proposes that from a potential set of mental accounts with different 
segregation level, generally the most attractive one is chosen (Thaler, 1985). Thaler calls this  
decision process ‘hedonic framing’, which might be a helpful guide explaining how people value 
propositions (Thaler, 1999). Even when an individual uses a ‘narrow framing’ mental account, 
there are several possibilities to segregate. Considering options, one might view naked options 
versus options in combination with its underlying asset: segregation related to the entities con-
sidered. Or one might aggregate or segregate current cash flows versus future cash flows, segre-
gation with respect to time. In this paper we will consider prospect theoretical option values in a 
time segregated narrow frame mental account setting. 
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2.3. Prospect theory 
In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky launched their prospect theory in what in retrospect showed to 
be a seminal paper. On the basis of experiments conducted among colleagues and students, they 
concluded that the theory of expected utility maximization does not hold in practice. According 
to Bernstein (1996), one of the corner stones of prospect theory is the cognitive difficulty to fully 
understand the subject matter, as nature is so complex that it is hard to draw valid generalizations 
from what we observe. Tversky and Kahneman showed that when subjects are asked to solve a 
range of choice problems, they evaluate cash flows by gains and losses in an asymmetric way. In 
situations of winning people were risk averse, while in situations of losing they were risk-
seeking. The experiments also showed that respondents are more sensitive to losses than to gains 
(loss aversion). Another important part of prospect theory is the finding that people’s subjective 
probabilities do not correspond to objective probabilities. These behavioral aspects are reflected 
by the parameters, risk attitude (risk-averse or risk-seeking), loss aversion and weighting func-
tion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Moreover risk attitude, loss aversion and perceived prob-
ability might be dependent on the subject’s recent cash flow history. After experiencing a finan-
cial gain subjects can increase their willingness to accept risks, while prior losses can decrease 
the willingness to take risks (Thaler and Johnson, 1990).  According to Barberis, Huang and San-
tos (2001), investors become less sensitive to losses after prior gains due to a shift of the refer-
ence point of the value function to a lower value. Conversely, after a prior loss investors become 
more loss averse. In this paper we will apply prospect theory including the perception of prob-
abilities in a static rather than a dynamic setting. However, the pricing framework can be easily 
extended into a dynamic setting. 
 
3. The Pricing Framework 
In the dichotomy representation of the prospect theory, there are two possible outcomes with 
related probabilities. The value of such a prospect is based on a value function (v) and a weight-
ing function (w). The value function is attached to the value of an outcome (x) and the weighting 
function to the probability of that outcome (q). For a prospect with a nonnegative (x1) and a 
negative outcome (x2) and corresponding probabilities q1 and q2, we get 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2211 xvqwxvqwV
−−++ +=  (1) 
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with the superscript ‘+’ being valid for nonnegative outcomes and the superscript ‘-’ for negative 
outcomes. 
The value function is typically given by 
( )
( )



<−λ−
≥
=
0,
0,
xx
xx
xv
b
a
  (2) 
with a and b being constants determining the curvature of the value function in the domain of 
gains and losses, respectively. λ controls for the so-called loss aversion and values larger than 
one imply that negative outcomes are perceived to be more painful than positive outcomes of the 
same magnitude. The weighting function is typically given by 
( ) ( )[ ] γγγγ −+= 11 qqqqw  (3) 
with γ being a constant that controls for the over- and underweighting of small and large prob-
abilities.  
The price of an option is the outcome of its perceived value by investors. In equilibrium, 
the marginal investor determines the price. We assume that the marginal investor prices the op-
tion according to the valuation of the prospect theory in a time and entity segregated narrow 
framing mental account. Lets consider the marginal investor is writing a European style call op-
tion on a non-dividend paying stock or index.  Two possible states will exist at the time of expi-
ration (t=T). The first one is: if the price of the underlying asset is higher than the exercise price 
(ST>K), the option will be exercised. The probability of being exercised (q) is given by 
( ) T
K
T dSSfq ∫
∞
=  (4) 
with ST being the price of the underlying asset at expiration, K being the exercise price and f(ST) 
being the probability density function of ST. The expected value (conditional on exercising the 
option), denoted by x, is then equal to 
( ) ( ) qdSSfKSx T
K
TT∫
∞
−−=  (5) 
The second state is the reverse of the first one: the price of the underlying asset is lower than the 
exercise price (ST≤K) and the option will not be exercised. The probability that the option is not 
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exercised is equal to (1-q) and its pay-off is zero. Therefore, in the case when the option writer is 
evaluating the option, x can be considered to be a loss and Equation 1 can be simplified to  
( ) ( )xvqwV −−=  (6) 
In addition to the potential negative pay-offs at t=T, the writer receives a premium at t=0, de-
noted by c. Assuming that we can invest the cash amount c at the risk-free interest rate (rf), its 
future value is equal to cexp(rfT). In equilibrium the prospect value of the invested cash amount c 
should be equal to the prospect value of x 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0exp =+ −−+ xvqwTrcv f  (7) 
Substituting the value functions from Equation 2 into Equation 7 gives the option value as 
( ) ( )( ) abf xqwTrc
1
)(exp −λ−= −  (8) 
We can determine x and q if the underlying price process is known. Assuming a geometric 
Brownian price process with drift α and volatility σ, then the future density function of the price 
of the underlying asset is 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( ) TSTTSSSf TTT πσσσ−α−−= 222lnexp 2220  (9) 
With the Equations 4, 5 and 9, q and x are determined as 
( )1−δΦ=q  (10) 
and 
( ) ( ) ( )110 exp −δΦδΦα−= TSKx  (11) 
with S0 being the current price of the underlying asset and Φ(δm) the cumulative standard normal 
distribution of δm, defined by 
( ) ( ){ } TTmKSm σσ+α+=δ 2ln 20  (12) 
Substituting the Equations 10 and 11 into Equation 8 gives the value of the segregated 
narrow framed call option from the writers’ point of view as  
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( ) abf KTSwTrc
1
1101 expexp −δΦδΦαδΦλ−= −−
−
 (13) 
with δm being defined in Equation 12 and w being defined in Equation 3. In a similar way the 
value of a segregated narrow framed put option can be derived. 
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4. Numerical example 
In order to demonstrate the effect of non-concave utility functions, loss aversion and probability 
perception on the price of an option, we show option values under different prospect parameters 
in relation to changes in the strike price. We define ‘prospect sentiment’ as the deviation of in-
vestor behavior from the standard expected utility framework. It is assumed that the fundamental 
value is captured by the option value according to the Black-Scholes theory. Suppose that the 
Black-Scholes parameter values are S0=100, α=0.1, rf=0.1, σ=0.2 and T=1. We consider three 
levels of prospect sentiment: 
• Zero prospect sentiment (linear value function, no loss aversion and no over-
/underestimation of small/large probabilities) referring to option values based on the 
Black-Scholes theory with prospect parameters a=1, b=1, λ=1 and γ=1; 
• Prospect sentiment, based on the observations from prospect theory that investors are risk 
averse for gains (concave value function), risk taking and loss averse for losses (convex 
value function), overestimating small probabilities and underestimating large probabili-
ties. The prospect parameter values are based on experimental evidence by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992): a=0.88, b=0.88, λ=2.25 and γ=0.61; 
• Moderate prospect sentiment including the observations from prospect theory, but with 
parameter values reflecting only 10% of the Tversky-Kahneman prospect sentiment: 
a=0.988, b=0.988, λ=1.125 and γ=0.961. 
Prospect option prices with respect to changes in strike price are given in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
Moderate prospect sentiment gives slightly increased prices in the order of 11% com-
pared to the Black-Scholes reference. Tversky-Kahneman parameter values based prospect sen-
timent gives substantial higher prices of about a factor two compared to prices according to the 
Black-Scholes theory. The higher prices under prospect sentiment increase the implied volatility 
as being calculated by the Black-Scholes option valuation formula as shown in Figure 2. This 
effect is consistent with observations made by Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley (1995) and Chris-
tensen and Prabhala (1998) that implied volatilities of short-term at-the-money equity index op-
tions are on average higher than the realized volatilities over the option’s life. 
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[Figure 2] 
 
The increase is most pronounced at low strike prices resulting in a pronounced volatility 
skew (or smirk). The pattern is well known for options on stocks and stock indices, particularly 
after the market crash of ’87, where out-of-the-money put options (and therefore in-the-money 
calls) are typically overpriced relative to at-the-money options (see for example Rubinstein, 
1994).  In our model, three effects lead to a mispricing of options; the most important one being 
loss aversion. Assuming a writer of an in-the-money call option, an upward movement in the 
stock price would be much more painful for him than a downward movement due to loss aver-
sion.  For out-of-the-money call options the effect is additionally based on the possibility that the 
option might become in-the-money and the buyer would exercise the option. Consequently, the 
writer would increase the implied volatility in order to be compensated for that. However, given 
the lower delta of out-of-the-money calls, the effects are less pronounced compared to the in-the-
money calls. Additionally, the more pronounced the prospect sentiment, the steeper the implied 
volatility curve. The implied volatility plot under moderate prospect sentiment is equivalent to 
the pattern observed with actual option prices. The Tversky-Kahneman based prospect sentiment 
results in a shape that is too extreme compared to a pattern implied out from actual market 
prices. 
As a further analysis, we consider the derivatives of the option price with the parameters 
of the Black-Scholes model, typically referred to as the ‘Greeks’ (Table 2). 
 
[Table 2] 
 
In general, absolute sensitivities increase with increasing prospect sentiment, except for 
vega. Given our prospect option pricing model, we derive two interesting results: Firstly, vega is 
positive under the no prospect sentiment assumption, but becomes increasingly negative with 
increasing prospect sentiment for in-the-money-call options. Therefore, an increase in volatility 
would reduce the call option price. At high strike prices (out-of-the-money call options) we no-
tice the increasing positive sensitivity at increasing prospect sentiment. This is due to the fact 
that our weighting function is modifying the perception of small and large probabilities. Sec-
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ondly, for deep in-the-money calls, delta becomes greater than one, even for moderate prospect 
sentiment. Therefore, the increase in the call option value is larger than the increase in the price 
of the underlying. At first glance this seems a puzzling result, but interestingly, both effects have 
already been documented in an empirical study of Bakshi et al. (2000). They empirically analyze 
some basic properties shared by
 
all standard Black-Scholes type option pricing models. Using 
S&P 500
 
options, they find that implications of one-dimensional diffusion
 
option models are not 
completely consistent with observed
 
option price dynamics. Their results are valid even after 
controlling for time decay and market
 
microstructure effects. The design of our pricing frame-
work can partly help to explain their empirical results. 
Additionally we consider the sensitivities with respect to the Tversky-Kahneman parame-
ters (Table 3).  
 
[Table 3] 
 
More risk averse behavior in the domain of gains (in this case smaller values for a) leads 
to higher call option prices, while more risk taking in the domain of losses (in that case smaller 
values for b) lead to lower call option prices. The more pronounced the risk attitude, the more 
pronounced the effect. A similar effect can be observed for the loss aversion parameter. The 
more loss avers the option writer (larger values for λ), the higher the call option price. An up-
ward movement in the stock price would be much more painful than a downward movement, and 
with increasing loss aversion the impact on the option price becomes stronger. In general, abso-
lute sensitivities decrease from in-the-money calls to out-of-the-money calls, except for the sen-
sitivity with respect to γ. The more the option writer overestimates small probabilities (the 
smaller γ), the lower the option price for in-the-money calls, but the higher the option price for 
(deep) out-of-the-money calls, given zero or moderate prospect sentiment. The call option writer 
is loosing money, if the out-of-the-money call is getting in-the-money and will be exercised. This 
will only happen with a small probability, but the more (s)he overestimates small probabilities 
(the smaller γ), the larger the value (s)he is asking for the out-of-the-money call. Interestingly, 
increased overestimation of small probabilities has a larger negative effect on the option price for 
near in-the-money calls than for deep in-the-money calls. This is due to the particular shape of 
the weighting function.  
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5. Empirical analysis 
We test the prospect option pricing model with end-of-the-day S&P 500 European options (SPX) 
premiums supplied by the CBOE. We opt to use data of 2002 and 2006, respectively being the 
year with the highest (26.1%) and being the year of the lowest realized volatility of the S&P 500 
(10.1%) in the ten year period from 1996 to 2006. Low volume option series with a volume less 
than 10 contracts per day have been ignored in the analysis. In addition to the prospect model we 
analyze also partial prospect pricing models including only one element of the prospect pricing 
model and we will refer to those models as ‘expected value’ (EV), ‘value function’ (VF) and 
‘weighting function’ (WF). As reference we use the Black-Scholes model with constant implied 
volatility (BS) for all option series of one particular day.  The relation between the parameters of 
the various models is shown in Table 4. We notice that the BS model is nested in the EV, VF and 
WF models and that all those models are nested in the prospect model. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
We perform an in-sample and an out-of-sample analysis. In the in-sample analysis, the parame-
ters of the models are estimated at minimum weighted root mean squared error (wRMSE) by the 
Newton steepest descent method. The wRMSE is volume weighted and determined by 
( )
∑
∑
=
=
−
=
n
i
i
n
i
iii
vn
ccv
wRMSE
1
1
2
model,
 (14) 
with ci being the actual option premium, ci,model being the premium predicted by the model, vi 
being the daily trading volume and n being the number of options of a particular trading day. All 
prices are given in US dollars. 
The average S&P 500 index is 994 in 2002 and 1310 in 2006. US weekly rates provided 
by Datastream have been used as risk-free rates of return. The average risk-free rate of return is 
1.8% in 2002 and 5.0% in 2006. The call price data is broken down into time to maturity inter-
vals and moneyness intervals, in line with the analysis by Christoffersen, Heston and Jacobs 
(2006). Moneyness (M) is being defined as  
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)exp(0 TrSKM f=  (15) 
Table 5 gives an overview of the number of observations and Table 6 gives an overview of the 
average call prices.  
 
[Table 5] 
[Table 6] 
 
The maximum number of observations lies around at-the-money options. The number of 
observations decreases with increasing time to maturity. Out-of-the-money option series are 
more frequent for the year 2002 compared to the year 2006 (on a relative basis). The analysis 
includes a wider range of moneyness intervals compared to the Christoffersen-Heston-Jacobs 
analysis. As a consequence also the range in option prices is wider.   
It is difficult to compare the option prices of 2002 with the 2006 prices as volatility, price 
of the underlying asset and risk-free rate of return are different for these years.  Taking the dif-
ference between the option prices of the various option moneyness classes of year 2002 minus 
year 2006 shows that at time to maturity of less than 80 trading days, the 2002 in-the-money op-
tions are lower priced than the 2006 in-the-money options (see Figure 3). For time to maturity of 
more than 180 trading days the option prices of 2002 are higher than the 2006 option prices. We 
have included the actual differences in option prices with the one predicted by the Black-Scholes 
model with average realized values for volatility, price of the underlying asset, risk-free rate of 
return and time to maturity into Figure 3. The differences for the model predicted prices are lar-
ger than the differences in actual option prices, especially for time to maturity of more than 20 
trading days, which strongly indicates mispricing between model predicted and actual prices.  
 
[Figure 3] 
 
Estimating the models using option prices (in-sample analysis) 
The parameters of the various models have been estimated at minimum weighted root mean 
squared error. Parameter values and weighted root mean squared error are given in Table 7. The 
fit of all models is better in the low volatility year (2006) compared to the high volatility year 
(2002). Judged by wRSME the nested models obviously have a poorer fit with the experimental 
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data. The models that include an element of the prospect theory are not nested. Of those models, 
the VF model gives the best fit, followed by the WF model and then by the EV model. Penaliz-
ing the models for the number of implied parameters by Akaike’s information criterion leads to 
the same conclusion about the fitting performance of the models.  
 
[Table 7] 
 
Additionally we have performed a Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the daily wRMSE data. 
The conclusions are given in Table 8 and show that the order of fitting performance (the prospect 
model fits better than the VF model; the VF model fits better than the WF model;  the WF model 
fits better than the EV model;  the EV model fits better than the BS model) is statistically signifi-
cant. 
 
[Table 8] 
 
A different representation of the fitting performance of the models with the empirical op-
tion prices can be given by its implied volatility surface. Using actual option prices and deter-
mining the implied volatility of the BS model we get – on the average – the familiar smile pat-
tern (see Figure 4), which is more pronounced the shorter the time till expiration of the option 
and flattens with high time till expiration of the option. In addition we can transform model pre-
dicted prices into BS model implied volatilities. From Figure 4 it is seen that the prospect, VF 
and WF models fit the empirical data quite well for in-the-money options. In the case of out-of-
the money options, all models underestimate the actual implied volatility at low time till expira-
tion and overestimate the actual implied volatility at high time till expiration. 
 
[Figure 4] 
 
Interestingly our marginal prospect investor is risk taking in the domain of gains, risk 
averse in the domain of losses, loss averse and has a weighting function that favors high prob-
abilities that the option will become in the money at expiration. This observation is different 
from the observations by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), as their experiments showed that deci-
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sion takers are risk avers in the domain of gains, risk taking in the domain of losses, loss averse 
and overestimate small probabilities. There might be two reasons for this difference. First of all, 
the experiments of Tversky and Kahneman are done with students and scholars and it has been 
observed that the financial option decisions of traders differ from decisions taken by students 
(Fox, Rogers and Tversky, 1996; Abbink and Rockenbach, 2005). The second reason might be 
that the Tversky-Kahneman data is based on the median of the estimates by the decision takers, 
while in the actual option trading the tails of the distribution of the subjective option values of 
potential investors are more important for the resulting actual option price than the average or 
median. 
 
Out-of-sample analysis 
The out-of-sample analysis is a measure for the forecasting performance of a model. We opt for 
a one (trading) day out-of-sample analysis in which the parameter values of a model are used to 
determine the option price of the next trading day. Table 9 shows the in-sample and out-of-
sample wRMSE for the years 2002 and 2006.  
 
[Table 9] 
 
In line with the in-sample wRSME, the out-of-sample wRSME is lower for the low vola-
tility year (2006) in comparison to the high volatility year (2002). In 2002 the average out-of-
sample performance of the WF model is better compared to the prospect model, the prospect 
model performs better than the EV model,  the EV model performs better than the VF model and  
the VF model performs better than the BS model. In 2006 the average out-of-sample perform-
ance of the prospect model is better compared to the WF model, the WF model performs better 
than the VF model,  the VF model performs better than the BS model and  the BS model per-
forms better than the EV model.  
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the daily wRSME of the various models is distribution-
free and does capture the daily correlation of the performance of the models. The conclusions, 
given in Table 10, show the following statistical significant order for 2002: the out-of-sample 
performance of the prospect model is better compared to the WF model, the WF model performs 
better than the VF model,  the VF model performs better than the EV model and the EV model 
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performs better than the BS model. For 2006 the order of model performance is the same as for 
2002, except that the BS performs better than the EV model, but this relation is not statistically 
significant. We consider the results from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test as strong evidence that 
the incorporation of (elements of) the prospect theory into option pricing models substantially 
improves the out-of-sample performance of these models. 
 
[Table 10] 
 
 The out-of-sample implied volatility surfaces are almost equal to the in-sample ones and 
do visually not differ from the implied volatility surfaces given in Figure 4, leading to equivalent 
conclusions. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study option prices in an economy where investors’ decisions are conform to 
the behavioral aspect of the prospect theory. Our theoretical marginal prospect investor writes 
European call options, is risk averse in the domain of gains, risk taking and loss averse in the 
domain of losses, and overestimates small and underestimate large probabilities of the option 
expiring in-the-money. In line with recent empirical studies, we find support for non-concave 
utility functions proposed by Kahneman and Tversky. Moderate prospect behavior of investors 
can explain the shape and size of the actual implied volatility skew, while prospect behavior 
based on the parameter values by Tversky and Kahneman is too severe for the actual observed 
implied volatility pattern. 
Empirical analysis shows that incorporation of prospect theoretical elements into Black-
Scholes option valuation (as a pricing model) significantly improves the fitting performance of 
the model with European call options on the S&P 500 index in in-sample as well as in out-of-
sample analysis.  Further, the analysis shows that the marginal investor’s behavior is different 
from the prospect theoretical observations. In stead of being risk averse in the domain of gains, 
risk taking and loss averse in the domain of losses, and overestimate small and underestimate 
large probabilities of the option expiring in-the-money, marginal writers of call options on the 
S&P 500 index are displaying the reverse behavior, except for loss aversion. 
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    Figure 1: Frames of the Müller-Lyer illusion 
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Figure 2: Implied volatility for changes in the strike price 
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Figure 3: Average option price differences  
(year 2002 minus year 2006) 
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Fig 4: Average implied volatility surfaces from S&P 500 call options 
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Table 1: Prospect call option prices for changes in the strike price* 
  Option price  (Prospect option price-BSprice)/BSprice 
K  BS #1 #2  #1         #2 
70  36.72 82.19 41.25       1.24        .12 
80  27.99 55.50 31.27       .98        .12 
90  19.99   35.95         22.20               .80        .11 
100  13.27   23.46         14.73                 .77        .11 
110  8.18   15.69         9.15              .92        .12 
120  4.71   10.67         5.34              1.27        .13 
* using the following parameters: S0=100, α=.1, rf=.1, σ=.2 and T=1with BS being the Black-Scholes reference with 
a=1, b=1, λ=1 and γ=1, #1 being the prospect sentiment based on the Tversky-Kahneman parameter values, a=.88, 
b=.88, λ=2.25 and γ=.61, and #2 being the moderate prospect sentiment with a=.988, b=.988, λ=1.125, γ=.961. 
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Table 5: Options data: number of observations 
 
Year 2002 
    Time to expiration (trading days)  
Moneyness T≤20 20<T≤80 80<T≤180 T>180 All 
M≤0.9 196 239 96 94 625 
0.9<M≤0.925 127 147 35 31 340 
0.925<M≤0.95 216 248 66 69 599 
0.95<M≤0.975 360 441 132 133 1066 
0.975<M≤1 601 759 229 244 1833 
1<M≤1.025 716 874 241 177 2008 
1.025<M≤1.05 636 736 196 147 1715 
1.05<M≤1.075 473 648 214 117 1452 
1.075<M≤1.1 374 574 187 121 1256 
1.1<M≤1.125 226 469 188 97 980 
1.125<M≤1.15 142 291 160 91 684 
1.15<M≤1.175 78 224 139 66 507 
1.175<M≤1.2 52 164 118 73 407 
M>1.2 60 337 410 329 1136 
All 4257 6151 2411 1789 14608 
 
 
Year 2006 
    Time to expiration (trading days)  
Moneyness T≤20 20<T≤80 80<T≤180 T>180 All 
M≤0.9 96 355 80 248 779 
0.9<M≤0.925 95 162 68 168 493 
0.925<M≤0.95 231 389 115 277 1012 
0.95<M≤0.975 656 676 267 334 1933 
0.975<M≤1 1332 2021 423 230 4006 
1<M≤1.025 1471 2185 366 247 4269 
1.025<M≤1.05 1039 2089 344 247 3719 
1.05<M≤1.075 336 1105 292 183 1916 
1.075<M≤1.1 124 379 184 151 838 
1.1<M≤1.125 52 105 118 95 370 
1.125<M≤1.15 13 37 38 62 150 
1.15<M≤1.175 8 36 16 42 102 
1.175<M≤1.2 2 22 9 35 68 
M>1.2 0 7 17 60 84 
All 5455 9568 2337 2379 19739 
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Table 6: Options data: average call option prices 
 
Year 2002 
    Time to expiration (trading days)  
Moneyness T≤20 20<T≤80 80<T≤180 T>180 All 
M≤0.9 140.04 195.91 194.86 213.53 180.88 
0.9<M≤0.925 85.03 93.66 109.57 145.30 96.79 
0.925<M≤0.95 64.46 74.91 93.24 126.00 79.04 
0.95<M≤0.975 42.38 57.26 78.63 108.70 61.30 
0.975<M≤1 24.10 41.21 64.02 92.77 45.31 
1<M≤1.025 11.30 28.61 51.16 78.86 29.57 
1.025<M≤1.05 5.18 18.11 39.58 67.23 19.98 
1.05<M≤1.075 2.47 11.49 30.32 52.71 14.65 
1.075<M≤1.1 1.27 7.46 22.34 45.09 11.46 
1.1<M≤1.125 0.71 5.02 17.14 40.16 9.83 
1.125<M≤1.15 0.47 3.65 12.77 34.02 9.17 
1.15<M≤1.175 0.37 2.76 9.91 27.48 7.57 
1.175<M≤1.2 0.29 2.10 7.06 20.92 6.68 
M>1.2 0.25 1.05 3.30 12.00 4.99 
All 22.37 30.97 38.70 67.14 34.17 
 
 
Year 2006 
    Time to expiration (trading days)  
Moneyness T≤20 20<T≤80 80<T≤180 T>180 All 
M≤0.9 194.54 174.48 210.90 185.84 184.31 
0.9<M≤0.925 113.20 114.68 117.67 135.41 121.87 
0.925<M≤0.95 79.19 83.00 94.53 109.77 90.77 
0.95<M≤0.975 47.96 53.73 68.36 86.97 59.54 
0.975<M≤1 20.56 29.81 48.85 67.84 30.93 
1<M≤1.025 4.32 13.45 31.24 51.76 14.05 
1.025<M≤1.05 0.60 4.01 18.02 35.98 6.48 
1.05<M≤1.075 0.13 1.43 9.96 24.82 4.73 
1.075<M≤1.1 0.07 0.62 4.85 20.40 5.03 
1.1<M≤1.125 0.06 0.29 2.40 15.87 4.93 
1.125<M≤1.15 0.03 0.20 1.20 10.09 4.53 
1.15<M≤1.175 0.08 0.12 0.66 7.28 3.15 
1.175<M≤1.2 0.05 0.13 0.37 5.24 2.79 
M>1.2 - 0.14 0.19 6.05 4.37 
All 20.83 26.02 41.27 74.05 32.18 
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Table 8: Conclusions from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test of daily wRSME 
(in-sample analysis) 
Year 2002 Year 2006 
wRSMEBS>wRSMEEV
***
 wRSMEBS>wRSMEEV
***
 
wRSMEBS>wRSMEVF
***
 wRSMEBS>wRSMEVF
***
 
wRSMEBS>wRSMEWF
***
 wRSMEBS>wRSMEWF
***
 
wRSMEBS>wRSMEProspect
***
 wRSMEBS>wRSMEProspect
***
 
wRSMEEV>wRSMEVF
***
 wRSMEEV>wRSMEVF
***
 
wRSMEEV>wRSMEWF
***
 wRSMEEV>wRSMEWF
***
 
wRSMEEV>wRSMEProspect
***
 wRSMEEV>wRSMEProspect
***
 
wRSMEVF<wRSMEWF
**
 wRSMEVF<wRSMEWF
***
 
wRSMEVF>wRSMEProspect
***
 wRSMEVF>wRSMEProspect
***
 
wRSMEWF>wRSMEProspect
***
 wRSMEWF>wRSMEProspect
***
 
***
 Significant at 1% level 
**
 Significant at 5% level 
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Table 9: In-sample and out-of-sample wRSME 
 
Year 2002 
wRMSE   
Models In-sample Out-of-sample 
Black-Scholes 3.02 (1.61) 3.57 (1.91) 
Expected Value 2.34 (1.28) 3.07 (1.61) 
Value Function 1.58 (0.79) 3.22 (2.25) 
Weighting Function 1.73 (0.98) 2.46 (1.31) 
Prospect 0.87 (0.55) 2.49 (1.87) 
 
Year 2006 
wRMSE   
Models In-sample Out-of-sample 
Black-Scholes 1.36 (0.48) 1.66 (0.66) 
Expected Value 1.18 (0.44) 1.75 (0.88) 
Value Function 0.95 (0.31) 1.61 (0.82) 
Weighting Function 1.07 (0.45) 1.55 (0.75) 
Prospect 0.62 (0.28) 1.50 (0.96) 
Standard deviation within brackets 
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Table 10: Conclusions from the Wilcoxon signed-rank test of daily wRSME 
(out-of-sample analysis) 
Year 2002 Year 2006 
wRSMEBS>wRSMEEV
***
 wRSMEBS<wRSMEEV 
wRSMEBS>wRSMEVF
***
 wRSMEBS>wRSMEVF
***
 
wRSMEBS>wRSMEWF
***
 wRSMEBS>wRSMEWF
***
 
wRSMEBS>wRSMEProspect
***
 wRSMEBS>wRSMEProspect
***
 
wRSMEEV>wRSMEVF
***
 wRSMEEV>wRSMEVF
***
 
wRSMEEV>wRSMEWF
***
 wRSMEEV>wRSMEWF
***
 
wRSMEEV>wRSMEProspect
***
 wRSMEEV>wRSMEProspect
***
 
wRSMEVF>wRSMEWF
***
 wRSMEVF>wRSMEWF
**
 
wRSMEVF>wRSMEProspect
***
 wRSMEVF>wRSMEProspect
***
 
wRSMEWF>wRSMEProspect
***
 wRSMEWF>wRSMEProspect
***
 
***
 Significant at 1% level 
**
 Significant at 5% level 
 
 
 
